COMMENTS

Implications of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 for Judicial
Presumptions of Market Efficiency
NathanielCardent
Over the past twenty years, the efficient capital market hypothesis ("ECMH") has risen to a prominent position in financial
and economic theory.' In its most commonly held form-known as
"semi-strong"--the ECMH states that the securities markets incorporate all available public information so rapidly that investors cannot develop a trading rule (including one based on research into company or industry fundamentals) that will systematically yield greater returns than the market. Recently, however,
theorists have increasingly questioned the ECMH. These theorists argue that irrational behavior and limited informationprocessing abilities can keep the price of securities at levels that
do not reflect their fundamental values.2
t B.S.BA. 1996, Georgetown University; J.D. Candidate 1999, The University of Chicago.
' See, for example, Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U Pa L Rev 851, 853 (1992) ("[Tlhere is no
other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than
the Efficient Market Hypothesis."), quoting Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence
RegardingMarket Efficiency, 6 J Fin Econ 95, 95 (1978).
' See Edward S. Adams and David E. Runkle, Solving a Profound Flaw in Fraud-onthe-Market Theory: Utilizinga Derivative ofArbitrage PricingTheory to Measure Rule lob5 Damages, 145 U Pa L Rev 1097, 1112 (1997) (noting "aggregate ambiguity" in studies attempting to verify the ECMH); Langevoort, 140 U Pa L Rev at 853-54 (discussing the rise
of "noise theory"); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos?Disagreement,Market
Failure,and Securities Regulation, 81 Va L Rev 611, "648-50 (1995) (noting that financial
theorists have become increasingly skeptical of the efficient market hypothesis). See also
In re LTV SecuritiesLitigation, 88 FRD 134, 145 n 7 (N D Tex 1980) ("[E]ven among aca-
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Despite this emerging debate, most courts and legal commentators have remained steadfastly committed to the ECMH.3
The Supreme Court, for example, employed the ECMH in the influential case Basic Inc v Levinson.4 In Basic, the Court endorsed

the "fraud-on-the-market" theory in private actions under Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule 10b-5.5 By assuming
the existence of an efficient market, the Court allowed groups of
investors to sue without showing individualized reliance upon the
fraudulent statement.
In 1995, however, Congress passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). 6 The measure was designed to stem what Congress believed to be an epidemic of
frivolous securities fraud suits. The concern was that any time a
company experienced a decline in its share price it could faceand could be debilitated by-a 10b-5 suit alleging fraud or misinformation. Hoping to quell such meritless litigation, Congress enacted a provision that caps the amount plaintiffs can recover in
damages. This limit on damages was in response to the possibility that markets might overreact when the fraud is disclosed.
Thus, the
PSLRA indicates a congressional skepticism of the
7
ECMH.
This Comment argues that the PSLRA provides evidence of
congressional distrust of the ECMH, and that courts-institutions that are less technically proficient and less democratically
accountable than Congress-should defer to Congress's skeptical
view. Accordingly, courts should reassess the several common law
demics, the strongest proponents of the efficient market hypothesis, there are some

doubts.).
' See, for example, Michael Y. Scudder, Comment, The Implicationsof Market-Based
Damages Caps in Securities Class Actions, 92 Nw U L Rev 435, 474 (1997) (arguing that
"[mlarket efficiency has essentially become a truism"); Stout, 81 Va L Rev at 648 (cited in
note 2) (noting the "great popularity" of the hypothesis in the legal culture).
4 485 US 224, 245-47 (1989) (allowing a class of defrauded plaintiff stockholders to
enjoy a rebuttable presumption of reliance upon the defendant's allegedly misleading
statements).
17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1997). In relevant part, the Rule reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange...
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading.
Pub L No 104-67, 109 Stat 737, codified at 15 USCA §§ 77z-1 to 78u-5 (Supp 1995).
15 USC § 78u-4(e) (limiting damages to the difference between the purchase price
and mean trading price of the security during the ninety day period following the disclosure of corrective information).
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doctrines, such as fraud-on-the-market, that rest on the ECMH.
Part I surveys courts' recent uses of the ECMH. This Part delineates three distinct uses of "efficiency": (1) as a goal for the market, (2) as a description of the market, and (3) as a heuristic device needed because of courts' limited competence in predicting
market movements. Part II analyzes the text, legislative history,
and policy goals of the PSLRA, focusing on those aspects most
relevant to market efficiency. This Part contends that in promulgating the PSLRA, Congress did not adhere to any particular financial theory; rather, it took a purely pragmatic approach to securities litigation. There is thus a sharp contrast between Congress's approach in the PSLRA and the manner in which courts
use descriptive efficiency.
Next, in Part HI this Comment proposes an approach that
reconciles this conflict. It concludes that courts should follow
Congress's lead and limit reliance upon the ECMH. Instead,
courts should develop a doctrine grounded less in finance and
more in policy and probability. This approach to the problem of
securities fraud would better utilize both the courts' institutional
competence (particularly in factfinding and assessing credibility)
and the "common sense" foundation of the theory described by the
Supreme Court in Basic.9

I. "COMMON LAw" DoCTRINEs PREMISED ON THE ECMH
Courts handling securities litigation use the notion of efficiency in several ways. These uses fall into three general categories. First, efficiency is often a normative goal. Certain judicial
decisions attempt to make the capital markets more efficient.
Second, efficiency is sometimes a purely descriptive term that
characterizes the operation of the capital markets. Here, judicial
decisions rest (or claim to rest) on a presumption about the existing state of the market. Third, when calculating damages,
courts often use models that invoke concepts of market efficiency.
In these cases, however, courts do not describe the market as efficient. Rather, given the courts' lack of expertise in the vagaries of
the securities markets, they use the models because no better
measurement device is available to them. This Part surveys these
three general ways in which courts have relied on the ECMH.

' In other words, courts use efficiency as a rule of thumb, rather than attempting to
describe the market as efficient.
' 485 US at 246 (noting that the presumption of reliance is "supported by common
sense and probability").
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Courts often discuss efficiency as one of the primary justifications for disclosure obligations."0 In this context, the concept of efficiency is a normative goal: an efficient market is desirable because it ensures that society's productive assets are transferred to
those who can make the best use of them, thereby maximizing
aggregate welfare." If market participants are unable to acquire
accurate information about a company's future prospects, then
their assessments of returns from capital will be inaccurate. The
result is too much investment in some firms ,(those that are able
to inflate expectations through inaccurate statements) and too
little in others (those that report accurately). 2 In the normative
context, then, the ECMH plays no role; efficiency is an aspiration
for, not a hypothesis about, the financial markets.
B. Descriptive Efficiency: Liability for Fraudulent Statements
or Omissions
The concept of efficiency also appears in securities litigation
as an attempt to describe the functioning of the securities markets. One of the most important types of descriptive efficiency is
the ECMH, which rose to prominence during the late 1970s and
early 1980s. 3 The ECMH predicts that financial markets digest
information in such a manner as to preclude the development of a
trading strategy that yields returns superior to those that can be
earned by purchasing a diversified portfolio of shares.'4
" See, for example, Shaw v Digital Equipment Corp, 82 F3d 1194, 1207 (1st Cir 1996)
(noting that a "central goal" of the regulatory system is "to promote fairness and efficiency"); LHLC Corp v Cluett, Peabody & Co, 842 F2d 928, 931 (7th Cir 1988) (arguing
that consolidated information disclosure facilitates efficient capital allocation).

" See John F. Barry, III, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U
Pa L Rev 1307, 1317 (1981) ("[The] continual redirection of capital from less promising to
more promising pursuits benefits the investor and society as a whole because both maximize welfare by allocating scarce resources to investment opportunities promising the
greatest return.").
"ISee In re LTV, 88 FRD at 145 ("Inaccurate information may result in skewed costs
of capital.").
See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportanceof Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 Mich L Rev 613, 621 (1988) ("[No

other vision of efficiency has captured the hearts and minds of the securities culture to the
degree that informational efficiency has.").
'" There are two forms of descriptive efficiency: "information arbitrage" and "fundamental value" efficiency. The former posits that the market digests information and that
share prices move in such a way as to prevent the use of public information to earn superior returns, while the latter relates to the market's ability to reflect properly the value of
the assets underlying the traded security. See Eckstein v Balcor Film Investors, 8 F3d
1121, 1129-30 (7th Cir 1993) (noting that in securities fraud cases "[w]e call a market 'effi-

cient' because the price reflects a consensus about the value of the security being traded-
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There are three versions of the ECMH, each making a progressively stronger claim. 5 The first, known as the "weak" form,
states only that past prices offer no indication of future price
movements. Consequently, the weak form predicts that it is futile
for investors to undertake so-called technical analysis based on
patterns in historical price data. 6 The intermediate version of the
theory, termed "semi-strong," asserts that all publicly available
information is reflected in market price, and that newly available
public information becomes incorporated in that market price almost instantaneously. This version suggests that further "fundamental value" analysis, such as using information about the
firm, the industry, or the economy, will not yield superior returns. Finally, the "strong" form maintains that all information,
public and private, is fully incorporated into the market price at
any given time. Under this theory, even insider trading would not
be profitable.
Because securities litigation normally concerns misinformation, the weak form of the ECMH is not relevant for courts. Likewise, courts have rejected the strong form of the theory,'7 as have
most empirical studies.'" The semi-strong version, however, has

not necessarily because the price captures the true value of the firm's assets but because
the price is the best available device to assess the significance of additional bits of information"). See also Baruch Lev and Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5
Damages:A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan L Rev 7, 20-21 (1994) (distinguishing "informational" from "fundamental" efficiency); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 Cornell L Rev 907, 913
(1989) (contrasting 'trading rule" with "value" efficiency). Because most securities fraud
litigation brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 involves passive investors who trade
minority positions in the securities allegedly affected by the defendants' actions, information arbitrage efficiency is most germane to this Comment.
"SThis description of the three forms of the ECMH is taken from Fischel, 74 Cornell L
Rev at 910-11.
" Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street 137 (Norton 1990) (noting
that if the weak form of the ECMH is true, "[tiechnical analysis is akin to astrology and
every bit as scientific").
'" See, for example, In re LTV, 88 FRD at 144 ("The price of the stock appears to reflect all publicly available information, but not all privately held information."). More generally, liability under the fraud-on-the-market theory, see Part I.B.1, would make little
sense if the market were strong-form efficient, because so long as it was known to anyone
other than the defendants themselves, information correcting the allegedly misleading
statement would also be reflected in the market price. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P.
Miller, Good Finance,Bad Economics:An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-MarketTheory, 42
Stan L Rev 1059, 1078 (1990) (noting that "the strong form of the ECMH and the fraudon-the-market theory are fundamentally incompatible").
" See Fischel, 74 Cornell L Rev at 911 (citing empirical studies); id at 912 n 11 ("The
empirical evidence to date (with some exceptions) appears to establish the validity of the
weak and semi-strong but not the strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.").
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been accepted by courts and become relevant to liability under
Rule 10b-5.
1.

Fraud-on-the-market and the ECMH.

The first and most important area in which courts use efficiency as a descriptive concept is the "fraud-on-the-market" theory. This theory developed out of a problem confronting plaintiffs
in Rule 10b-5 litigation. Because these plaintiffs were generally
investors holding passive positions, most individuals' losses were
likely to be small. Consequently, no single investor could expect
to benefit from bringing an action because, in all likelihood, the
costs of litigation would far outweigh any potential recovery.
Class action litigation offered a solution to this problem. By aggregating claims in a class action, it would be economically viable
to pursue Rule 10b-5 suits that would serve as a private enforcement mechanism. 9
However, the courts that inferred a private right of action
from Rule 10b-52" used the traditional requirements of common
law fraud in constructing such an action.2 Hence, plaintiffs were
required to demonstrate actual reliance on the defendant's misleading statement (or omission). This requirement creates an obvious problem: to obtain class certification, plaintiffs must show
that common questions of law and fact predominate,' but reliance (almost by definition) is an individual matter.
By eliminating the need to prove individual reliance, the
fraud-on-the-market theory facilitates class certification in securities litigation.' In Basic, the Supreme Court described the
fraud-on-the-market theory as creating a "rebuttable presump-

" See Basic, 485 US at 231 ("[The existence of) a private cause of action ... constitutes
an essential tool for the enforcement of the 1934 Acet's requirements.").
" See id at 230-31; Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 196 (1976). See also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, S Rep No 104-98, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 4
(1995), reprinted in 1995 USCCAN 679, 683 ("[C]ourts have held that Congress impliedly
authorized such actions.).
2 Generally stated, the elements of a Rule 10b-5 action are: (1) a material false or
misleading statement or the omission of a fact necessary to make a statement not misleading, (2) scienter; (3) reliance by the plaintiff; (4) causation; (5) injury. In re Burlington
CoatFactorySecurities Litigation,114 F3d 1410,1417 (3d Cir 1997).
FRCP 23(b)(3). In addition to common questions of law and fact, a class action requires: (1) a class so large that joinder is impracticable, (2) a representative party with
claims and defenses typical of the class, and (3) a representative party that will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class. FRCP 23(a).
' Basic, 485 US at 242 ("Requiring proof of individualized reliance.., would have
prevented [the plaintiffs] from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues then
would have overwhelmed the common ones.").
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tion of reliance' in circumstances where "materially misleading
statements have been disseminated into an impersonal, welldeveloped market for securities.' When the security in question
trades in a market that meets the requisite conditions, the plaintiff is not required to demonstrate individualized reliance; class
certification is therefore much easier. Importantly, the courts'
understanding of "reliance" changes fundamentally under this
theory. The fact that the purchaser bought in a developed securities market does not make that buyer's reliance on any particular
statement probable, or even more likely. As a result, the inquiry
no longer concentrates on whether the purchaser relied on the defendant's statements or omissions." Rather, as articulated by the
Basic Court, the fraud-on-the-market presumption rests on the
belief that "[a]n investor who buys or sells stock at the price set
by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of thatprice."'
An earlier case that played a prominent role in the rise of the
fraud-on-the-market theory also stated the importance of the
market price to the investor. In In re LTV Securities Litigation,'
the court described the market as the "unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the information available to it,
the value of the stock is worth the market price."2 In short, Basic
and its forerunners invoke a descriptive notion of market efficiency, more specifically, the semi-strong version of the ECMH.
Although the Basic Courtes own language uses "efficient" only
once in describing the securities market,"0 it quotes language
from another Rule 10b-5 case, Peil v Speiser,," that is essentially

Id. Despite the Court's formulation, an inference of reliance is neither the only, nor
even necessarily the most desirable, way of understanding fraud-on-the-market. See Part
III.B. Whether the presumption is actually rebuttable is a contentious issue. See id at 256
n 7 (White concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that "rebuttal is virtually
impossible in all but the most extraordinary case"); Fischel, 74 Cornell L Rev at 918-19
(cited in note 14) (discussing the difficulties inherent in rebutting the presumption and
concluding that it is "for all practical purposes... non-rebuttable'). The Basic majority
suggests that the presumption might be rebutted through a showing that corrective disclosures counteracted the price effects of the initial misstatements. See Basic, 485 US at
248-49. See Parts I.B.2 and III.C for further discussion of this view.
Basic, 485 US at 247.
If the misrepresentation deflates the share price, then sellers who received a lower
price as a result of the fraud may also recover-this was the situation in Basic itself. 485
US at 228. Analytically, the situations are identical, so this Comment will concentrate on
the more common case of the allegedly defrauded buyer.
"Id at 247 (emphasis added).
88 FRD 134 (N D Tex 1980).
Id at 143.

"485 US at 249 n 29 (discussing "the assumption that Basic shares are traded on a
well-developed, efficient, and information-hungry market").
" 806 F2d 1154 (3d Cir 1986).
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a verbatim recitation of the semi-strong ECMI-: "[T]he price of a
company's stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company and its business."32 The Basic Court
also cited academic literature on the ECMH.' In short, the Supreme Court clearly chose to use efficiency as a characterization
of the securities market.' Numerous writers have noted the link
between the plurality opinion in Basic and the semi-strong
ECMH.
Despite its analysis, the Basic Court offered little guidance to
lower courts in construing the relationship between the fraud-onthe-market theory and the ECMH. 3" As the lower courts have developed the doctrine, they have tightened the connection between
the semi-strong version of the ECMH and fraud-on-the-market.
The Third Circuit's decision in In re Burlington Coat Factory Se-

curities Litigation37 displays one of the clearest commitments to
the ECMH, describing an efficient market as one in which information "is immediately incorporated into stock prices," 8 and citing articles linking the ECMH and the fraud-on-the-market theory. 9 Other courts also have closely tied market efficiency to the
presumption of reliance, though often not as rigorously as the
Third Circuit." Nevertheless, courts frequently invoke descriptive
"Basic, 485 US at 241, quoting Peil, 806 F2d at 1160.
Basic, 485 US at 246 n 24, citing Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern FinanceTheory in
SecuritiesFraud Cases InvolvingActively Traded Securities, 38 Bus Law 1, 4 & n 9 (1982);
Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the TotalMix, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 373, 374 n 1, 374-81 (1984).
The majority nevertheless recognized its lack of expertise: "We need not determine
by adjudication what economists and social scientists have debated through the use of sophisticated statistical analysis and the application of economic theory." 485 US at 246 n
24. See also Part III.B.4.
"See Scudder, Comment, 92 Nw U L Rev at 461 (cited in note 3) (asserting that "the
presumption of reliance created by the fraud-on-the-market becomes incoherent if our
markets are informationally inefficient"); Adams and Runkle, 145 U Pa L Rev at 1109
(cited in note 2) ("The Court [in Basic] based its adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory on its implicit assumption of the validity of the principles underlying the ECMH.");
Macey and Miller, 42 Stan L Rev at 1078 (cited in note 17) ("It is clear that the Supreme
Court implicitly applied the semi-strong form of the ECMH in Basic.").
"See Abell v Potomac Insurance Co, 858 F2d 1104, 1120 (5th Cir 1988) ("Basic essentially allows each of the circuits room to develop its own fraud-on-the-market rules."), vacated on other grounds in FryarvAbell, 492 US 914 (1989).
114 F3d 1410 (3d Cir 1997).
Id at 1425.
Id at 1415 n 1, citing Jonathan R. Macey, et al, Lessons from FinancialEconomics:
Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 Va L Rev 1017,
1017 (1991) (describing the relationship between the fraud-on-the-market theory and the
ECMH); Fischel, 74 Cornell L Rev at 908-12 (cited in note 14) (same).
4' See Wielgos v Commonwealth Edison Co, 892 F2d 509, 510 (7th Cir 1989) (arguing
that the Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory "because capital markets
efficiently establish prices that embed available information"); O'Neil v Appel, 165 FRD
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efficiency in the form of the semi-strong ECMH in litigation under Rule 10b-5.
However, despite the nearly universal acceptance of the
proposition that the fraud-on-the-market theory and the ECMH
are closely intertwined, a closer analysis of the efficiency requirement indicates that the ECMH plays a substantially smaller
role than the post-Basic courts' language indicates. As discussed
above, Basic uses the fraud-on-the-market theory in answering a
simple question: Was the group of traders, as a whole, adversely
affected by the defendant's fraud? If so, then they can recover,
transforming the private action under Rule 10b-5 into the functional equivalent of fraud insurance.4' The fraud-on-the-market
presumption thus depends on the probability that a firm's share
price will respond to new information. If that probability is high,
then the presumption makes sense, because in all likelihood,
some traders acted on the incorrect information, thereby affecting
market price.
Importantly, these traders need not respond to this information in a perfectly (or even largely) efficient manner. If the price
movement was in the proper direction, it is sensible to apply the
presumption. The theory does not require that the magnitude of
such a response be perfect (as the semi-strong ECMH would predict). Hence, while the existence of an informationally efficient
market is a sufficient condition for the fraud-on-the-market theory to make sense (because all the information is not only incorporated, but is incorporated to such a degree that further research is futile), it is not a necessary one. The justification for the
fraud-on-the-market theory-facilitating the formation of a plaintiff class-asks a "yes or no" question about a security's response
to fraudulent information. Justice Blackmun acknowledged this
inquiry in Basic, noting that "we do not intend conclusively to
adopt any particular theory of how quickly and completely pub479, 500 (W D Mich 1996) ("The linchpin of the fraud-on-the-market theory is the existence of an efficient market."); Kriendler v Chemical Waste Management, Inc, 877 F Supp
1140, 1150 n 8 (N D IMl1995) ("Upon publication of the information, the market immediately reacts, adjusts, and incorporates the new information into the stock price."). There is
some disparity in the circuit courts' tolerance for barriers to information dissemination.
Compare Kaplan v Rose, 49 F3d 1363, 1378 n 3 (9th Cir 1994) (discussing limitations on
the flow of information into a market that is nevertheless efficient for purposes of establishing fraud-on-the-market, and observing that even an "efficient market will ignore irrelevant articles and articles that did not appear in sufficiently circulated and credible
sources"), with Freeman v Laventhol and Horwath, 915 F2d 193, 198 (6th Cir 1990) (describing an inefficient market as one that "does not incorporate into its price all the available information about the value of a security").
" See Part II.C for further discussion of the insurance function of private Rule 10b-5
actions.
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licly available information is reflected in market price."42 In the
end, the fraud-on-the-market theory captures a simple intuition-that "market professionals generally consider most publicly
announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.4 3
2.

Truth-on-the-market: a stronger application of
the ECMH.

Courts' use of efficiency as a descriptive notion also appears
in the counterweight to the fraud-on-the-market theory: the
"truth-on-the-market" defense. This defense asserts that a plaintiff class cannot rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory to establish reliance when information correcting the fraudulent disclosure was readily available in the marketplace at the time of the
fraudulent disclosure. If courts conclude that a market is efficient
enough to support the fraud-on-the-market theory, then they
must also conclude that the market is adept at incorporating
publicly available corrective information into the price. Consequently, so long as the corrective disclosures had reached the
marketplace by the time of the purchase or sale, the plaintiffs
will not have paid a fraud-induced premium (or sold at a discount).
The truth-on-the-market defense has been described as a
"corollary" of the fraud-on-the-market theory." In fact, the defense makes a much stronger claim about market efficiency than
does the initial presumption of market reliance. Unlike the fraudon-the-market theory, truth-on-the-market involves a positive assertion regarding the magnitude of the market's response to new
information. Suppose that both a misleading statement and corrective information are available to the market. To fulfill the requirements of fraud-on-the-market, it is only necessary to infer
that the fraud affected the share price. The truth-on-the-market
assertion, by contrast, declares that the corrective information
offset any inflation caused by the defendant's fraud. To reach this
outcome, it does not suffice to say that markets respond to infor4

Basic, 485 US at 248 n 28.
Id at 247 n 24. See also Langevoort, 140 U Pa L Rev at 900 (cited in note 1) (arguing

that in the fraud-on-the-market theory, the "efficient market hypothesis is invoked, but in
ways that on close inspection are neither necessary nor sufficient to the ultimate conclu-

sion").
" See Associated Randall Bank v Griffin, Kubik, Stephens, and Thompson, Inc, 3 F3d
208, 214 (7th Cir 1993) ("[T]he fraud-on-the-market theory approved in [Basic] has a
truth-on-the-market corollary."); Wallace v Systems & ComputerTechnology Corp, Fed Secur L Rep (CCH) 99,578 at 97,868 (E D Pa 1997) ("An essential corollary to [the fraudon-the-market theory] is a truth on the market' defense.").
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mation. Rather, one must conclude that the corrective information affected the market as much as the misleading statement.
Hence, the markets must respond completely and accurately to

any information available. Viewed in this way, the truth-on-themarket defense mandates a substantially greater commitment to
the semi-strong version of the ECMH than does the fraud-on-themarket theory.45
Courts applying the truth-on-the-market defense have given
the claim varying degrees of potency. Some, clearly committed to
the descriptive notion of market efficiency, have allowed the defense to negate a plaintiff's fraud-on-the-market claim simply because the information was available.4" Similarly, others have required plaintiffs to show that the alleged correcting information
was not publicly available.4' In contrast, some courts have required defendants to show more than the mere availability of information, either allowing the factfinder to decide whether the
correct information offset the fraud48 or, alternatively, requiring
proof that the corrective information was disseminated with a
sufficient degree of "intensity and credibility."49 Regardless of
which formulation is applied, the truth-on-the-market defense
presumes that the corrective information acts as a counterweight
to the fraudulent statement or omission. Hence, it too applies the
ECMH, invoking market efficiency as a descriptive concept.
C. Heuristic Efficiency: Calculating Damages in
Rule 10b-5 Cases
The concept of efficiency also enters securities litigation
when courts attempt to ascertain the damages suffered by investors who are victims of fraud. Here, efficiency is a heuristic tool
rather than an attempt to describe the markets. Although Basic
"See Langevoort, 140 U Pa L Rev at 905 (cited in note 1) (noting that the truth-onthe-market defense "potentially makes a far stronger efficiency claim" than the fraud-onthe-market theory).
"See, for example, Roots Partnershipv Lands'End,Inc, 965 F2d 1411, 1420 (7th Cir
1992) (denying plaintiffs' claim because "the fraud-on-the-market theory compels the conclusion that the price of Lands' End common stock reflected' the corrective information);
Wielgos, 892 F2d at 515 (rejecting claim that defendants' failure to disclose the assumptions underlying cost projections in a prospectus led to fraud-on-the-market because "professional investors and analysts surely deduced what was afoot").
' See Kriendler, 877 F Supp at 1157 (rejecting claim based on nondisclosure of adverse industry trends because the trends "were known to the market and thus presumably
to the Plaintiffs").
"See Saddle Rock Partners,Ltd v Hiatt, Fed Secur L Rep (CCH) 99,413 at 96,701
(W D Tenn 1996).
" In re Apple Computer Securities Litigation, 886 F2d 1109, 1114-15 (9th Cir 1989);
Wallace, Fed Secur L Rep (CCH) at 97,868 (adopting theApple test).
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purported to leave the question open," the commonly accepted
damages rule in Rule 10b-5 cases is the "out-of-pocket" theory articulated. by Judge Sneed in his concurrence in Green v Occidental Petroleum.5 Under this principle, plaintiffs are entitled to recover "the difference between the purchase price and the value of
the stock at the date of purchase." 2 By taking the difference between what the share price was (as inflated by fraud) and what it
would have been absent fraud, the theory "measures precisely the
extent to which the purchaser has been required to invest a
greater amount than otherwise would have been necessary."' 3
Thus, if the actual price after the fraud were $20, and the price
without fraud would have been $15, a plaintiff buyer could recover $5 per share purchased. This theory has been widely
adopted in fraud-on-the-market cases.'
Irrespective of the particular method a court chooses, the
court's role in assessing damages is to estimate-to the best of its
ability-what the stock price would have been without the defendant's misleading statement or omission on the date of the statement or omission. Formally, this process does not require any
presumption that a stock price is efficient in the information arbitrage sense.' The plaintiff's out-of-pocket damages are simply the
difference between the price paid and what the price would have
been absent fraud. If the ECMH is correct, then this price will accurately reflect all available information about the ability of the
underlying assets to produce income. On the other hand, if the
market is not informationally efficient, then those trading subse-

5 Basic, 485 US at 248 n 28 ("[Olur decision today is not to be interpreted as addressing the proper measure of damages in litigation of this kind.').
61 541 F2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir 1976) (Sneed concurring).
Id at 1344. Green dealt with fraud that inflated the share price, thereby harming
buyers. If the misleading statement or omission has a deflating effect, the difference between the sale price and value at the date of sale would be used instead.
' Id. Notice that any loss incurred by a defrauded purchaser is mirrored by a windfall
gain for the seller. As a result, the issuer is cast into the role of insurer, despite enjoying
none of the benefits of the fraudulent inflation.

"See, for example, Associated Randall Bank, 3 F3d at 214; In re Executive Telecard,
Ltd SecuritiesLitigation, 979 F Supp 1021, 1025 (S D NY 1997); Seagoing Uniforms Corp
v Texaco, Inc, 1989-90 Transfer Binder Fed Secur L Rep (CCH)

94,791 at 94,257 (S D

NY 1989).

"Fundamental value efficiency is irrelevant to damage calculations unless Judge
Sneed's reference to "value" in Green is understood to require that the plaintiff receive the
difference not between the price paid and what the price would have been, but rather be-

tween the price paid and what the price should have been. See Green, 541 F2d at 1344
(Sneed concurring). Yet there is no reason to believe that a plaintiff ought to recover more
if the market otherwise overvalued the stock or less if stock was undervalued. The private
Rule 10b-5 action is designed to protect buyers from the consequences of fraud, see notes

75-81 and accompanying text, not inefficiency.
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quent to the fraudulent statement may have been able to discover
that the security was mispriced (for reasons other than the fraud
itself)." The out-of-pocket method of damage calculation is unaffected by either of these situations. The objective is merely to determine what price the plaintiff would have paid, not whether
that price was a truly accurate reflection of the security's worth.
As much as Rule 10b-5 damages are not designed to compensate
(or penalize) plaintiffs for market departures from fundamental
value, neither do they aim to assess the desirability of the stock
as an investment absent fraud. 7
Notwithstanding this distinction, many attempts to determine what the price would have been implicitly incorporate the
ECM-rs assumptions about the role of publicly available information. Hence, while the out-of-pocket damages theory (unlike either fraud-on-the-market or truth-on-the-market) does not necessarily incorporate a descriptive notion of efficiency, courts may
presume that the market is efficient in order to determine the
correct remedy. In this situation, efficiency is a heuristic device;
while the market may be inefficient, courts have neither the time
nor the expertise to determine whether this is the case.
At its simplest, the calculation of damages could involve a
projection based on financial information and other data readily
available on the date of the fraud. In essence, courts would pretend to be investment analysts, using tools such as the market
model" to arrive at the share price. In doing so, however, the
court implicitly accepts the ECMH because it asserts that the
price would have been equal to the value that the available information suggested was appropriate. Typically, courts (or, more
frequently, experts or special masters) use more sophisticated
techniques to assess damages. The two most common are the
"event study" and "comparable index" approach.59 In the end, both
Here, the challenge to market efficiency asks whether a trader would be able to earn
superior returns by searching for information about the firm, industry, or economy, not by
uncovering the defendant's deception. The role of corrective information in securities litigation and its relationship to courts' use of the ECMH is analyzed in the context of the
truth-in-the-market defense to a fraud-on-the-market claim. See Part I.B.2.
See note 14.
The market model describes the relationship between an individual stocls returns
and market returns by positing a linear relationship between them and estimating the parameters (slope and intercept) through regression. See Adams and Runkle 145 U Pa L Rev
at 1122-26 (cited in note 2) (describing the market model in greater detail).
The comparable index method involves constructing a "value line," i.e., the hypothetical price of the stock absent fraud over the period in question, by using the market
model to work backwards from the disclosure date. The event study method, by contrast,
assumes that the actual price and value line move in tandem except on days when
fraudulent information entered the market. For a detailed discussion and critique of each
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of these techniques often incorporate a presumption of information efficiency." The award presumes that the price of the stock
on the date of the plaintiff's purchase, absent fraud, would have
incorporated all of the information used by the court in making
its determination of value. 1 However, these methods do not represent an attempt to describe the operation of the securities markets. Rather, they serve as a heuristic tool-a "best guess" that,
given the resources available to the court, facilitates the calculation process even if a court is suspicious of its ability to describe
market operations precisely.
Efficiency thus appears in several forms in securities litigation: as a normative goal, as a descriptive assertion about market
characteristics (through the use of the semi-strong ECMH), and
as a heuristic device useful in calculating damages. The next Part
turns to Congress, examining its treatment of market efficiency
in its recent effort to curtail securities suits.
H.

CONGRESSIONAL TREATMENT OF MARKET EFFICIENCY IN
THE PSLRA

In 1995, Congress passed the PSLRA in an effort to stem the
growth of what it perceived to be frivolous securities litigation.
Both the statute and its legislative history have important implications for judicial presumptions of market efficiency. This Part
argues that the PSLRA exhibits a decidedly atheoretical, practical approach to the regulation of the securities markets.
A.

Background and Objectives

The PSLRA was enacted against a backdrop of legislative
and regulatory efforts designed to promote the efficiency of the
securities markets. Much of the normative use of efficiency discussed in Part L.A is traceable to Congress and the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"). For example, the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reflects Congress's
desire to use securities regulation to improve capital markets'
ability to reflect the value of underlying assets. The House Coinmethod, see Bradford Cornell and R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure
Damages in Fraudon the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L Rev 883, 897-911 (1990).
' See Langevoort, 140 U Pa L Rev at 910 (cited in note 1) (arguing that both the comparable index and event study methods are "firmly and explicitly grounded in assumptions generated by the efficient market hypothesis").
Actually, the court is assuming that its own chosen valuation method is correct.
Consequently, not only does it assume that the price would have incorporated all of the information used by the court, but also that the market would have ignored information or
valuation techniques not related to the method chosen in the litigation.
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merce Committee Report declares that "U]ust as artificial manipulation tends to upset the time function of an open market, so
the hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the
operation of the markets as indices of real value." 2 Numerous
scholars have noted the role that efficiency concerns play in the
legislative and regulatory context."c In large part, concern that
existing litigation practices were impairing the ability of the disclosure system to improve market efficiency motivated the reform
effort underlying the PSLRA. 4
Armed with statistical evidence of the frequency and magnitude of suits,' as well as anecdotal evidence of frivolous or abusive litigation practices,66 Congress began considering legislation
to reform securities fraud liability in early 1995. This effort culminated in the PSLRA, which had three objectives: (1) to encourage voluntary disclosure of information; (2) to "empower investors" so that they, not their lawyers, control litigation; and (3) to
Securities Exchange Bill of 1934, HR Rep No 1383, 73d Cong, 2d Sess 11 (1934), reprinted in J.S. Ellenberger and Ellen P. Mahar, eds, 5 Legislative History of the Securities
Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 11 (Rothman 1973).
"See Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Commerce, 104th Cong,
1st Sess 204 (1995) (testimony of SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt) (arguing that the disclosure system has "led to fair and efficient markets in our country"); Securities Litigation
Reform Proposals Hearings, S 240, S 667, and HR 1058 before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, 104th Cong, 1st
Sess 13-14 (1995) (testimony of J. Carter Beese, Jr., Chairman of Capital Markets Regulatory Reform Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies) (noting that "a regulatory and legal structure that promotes liquidity, transparency, honesty, and efficiency"
is necessary to encourage investment); Stout, 87 Mich L Rev at 621-22 (cited in note 13)
(noting the increasing importance that the goal of efficiency plays in securities regulation).
But see Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va L Rev 669, 682-83 (1984) (arguing that mutually beneficial bargains for information may be more effective than mandatory disclosure).
"See Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, HR Rep No 104-50, 104th Cong, 1st
Sess 14 ("Congress enacted the Federal securities laws in 1933 and 1934 to protect investors and promote the efficient functioning of our capital markets. Today, private lawsuits
under those statutes create precisely the opposite effect."); Securities Litigation Reform
Proposals Hearings at 8 (statement of Senator Gramm during opening statement of Senator Domenici) ("[C]urrent practices are limiting the ability of the financial markets to
work because companies are making decisions based on potential litigation costs instead
of decisions that are driven by the marketplace to create jobs, growth, and opportunity for
our people.").
"For example, a Senate Report claimed that although investors recover only "pennies
on the dollar," over $1.4 billion was paid out in settlements during 1994 alone, much of
which went to plaintiffs' lawyers. S Rep No 104-98 at 9 (cited in note 20).
"Securities Litigation Reform Proposals Hearings at 36 (statement of Senator Domenici) (noting the "cookie cutter' complaints alleging that Phillip Morris had attempted
to "create and prolong the illusion of... success in the toy industry"). The case he ws discussing is In re Phillip MorrisSecuritiesLitigation,872 F Supp 97, 98 (S D NY 1995), affd
in part and revd in part, San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v
Phillip MorrisCos, Inc, 75 F3d 801 (2d Cir 1996).
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encourage plaintiffs to pursue valid claims while simultaneously
facilitating defendants' resistance to frivolous suits.' These goals
all reflect a commitment to creating efficient markets (i.e., normative efficiency). Disclosure is desirable because it facilitates
the proper valuation of assets and thus permits an efficient allocation of society's productive resources. Provisions ensuring that
investors, rather than lawyers, control the course of litigation enhance the ability of private actions to serve as efficient enforcement mechanisms by aligning control over litigation with the financial interests of defrauded shareholders, not their attorneys.'
Similarly, the provisions reducing plaintiff leverage improve the
efficiency of the private action as an enforcement tool by
strengthening defendants' ability to resist frivolous suits.6 9
B.

The PSLRA Damage Limitation Provisions: Challenging
Descriptive Efficiency

Among the most important PSLRA provisions reducing the
plaintiff class's leverage in Rule 10b-5 suits is a limitation on the
amount of damages available in fraud-on-the-market cases. Although it considered several alternatives," Congress settled on
the following limitation:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any private action
arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff seeks to establish damages by reference to the market price of a security, the award of damages to the plaintiff shall not exceed
the difference between the purchase or sale price paid or received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the subject security and the mean trading price of that security during the
90-day period beginning on the date on which the information correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the action is disseminated to the market.7
Through this provision, the PSLRA provides for a "look-back" period following the corrective disclosure so that plaintiffs will not
S Rep No 104-98 at 5-6 (cited in note 20).
The "most adequate plaintiff," 15 USC § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i), and settlement, 15 USC
§ 78u-4(aX6)-(7), provisions are the primary mechanisms for achieving this goal. Elimination of the possibility of a "bounty" for lead plaintiffs with minimal holdings (and their attorneys) is designed to reduce the number of frivolous suits. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, HR Conf Rep No 104-369, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 USCCAN 730, 734.
' These provisions include more stringent pleading requirements as well as the damage limitation and safe harbor provisions discussed in Parts II.B and II.0, respectively.
7'

See Part II.C.

7

PSLRA § 101, 109 Stat at 748-49, codified at 15 USC § 78u-4(e)(1).
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be overcompensated if the markets overreact to a disclosure correcting the initial misleading statement or omission. In arriving
at this conclusion, Congress relied heavily on a "crash" theory of
market movement posited by Professors Baruch Lev and Meiring
de Villiers.72 This model predicts that share prices will systematically overreact and correct following a corrective disclosure.73
Acceptance of the Lev and de Villiers "crash" model of market movement subsequent to corrective disclosure suggests, for
two distinct reasons, that Congress has rejected the semi-strong
version of the ECMH. First, the damages provision suggests that
Congress accepts that stock prices systematically rise (following
the initial crash) after corrective information is disclosed. More
precisely, prices rise more than those of other securities whose returns are comparably correlated to market returns. This increase
suggests that a trading rule exists that would offer superior returns on a regular basis. By purchasing stocks immediately after
a scandal is revealed, investors could, on average, "beat the market--contrary to the ECMffs predictions.
Second, Congress apparently believes that price movement
subsequent to the corrective disclosure is attributable not to new
information entering the market, but rather to market readjustment following the initial overreaction to the unveiling of the
fraud. Over the course of the ninety day postdisclosure "lookback" period, other macroeconomic, industry, and firm-specific information is likely to enter the market. Congress appears to think
that price changes will be a reflection of both this new information and the response to the overreaction. Consequently, the
damages limitation provision indicates that Congress, fully supportive of efficiency as a normative concept, is skeptical of its accuracy as a description of the markets. The next question, then, is
whether Congress adopted an alternative theoretical approach to
describe the operation of the financial markets.
C. Congress Has Not Adopted a Theoretical Alternative to
the ECMH
The Lev and de Villiers proposal to which Congress referred
in developing the limitation on damages posits a descriptive theory of price movements that is facially incompatible with the
See S Rep No 104-98 at 20 & n 58 (cited in note 20), citing Lev and de Villiers, 47
Stan L Rev at 22 (cited in note 14) (arguing that since "crash prices are not reliable indicators of true value, . . . they should not be used to compute damages").

Lev and de Villiers, 47 Stan L Rev at 13-17 (cited in note 14) (arguing that uninformed investors may react to others' trades, not the information itself, leading to continued selling even after the price reflects the new negative information).
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semi-strong ECMH. Congress, however, while looking to Lev
and de Villiers, did not entirely adopt their theoretical model. Instead, Congress adhered to no particular theoretical model of
market movement.
By creating an upper bound on the amount of damages that a
plaintiff may recover, the PSLRA's limitation on damages promotes the goal of making private enforcement actions more efficient by allowing defendants to resist frivolous litigation with the
knowledge that damages will be capped. This certainty also reduces plaintiffs' leverage in settlement negotiations. If Congress
had been convinced that prices systematically crash following a
corrective disclosure event, it would have prescribed a computation method in the PSLRA, given the desire to "rectify the uncertainty in calculating damages' 75 and simplify securities litigation.
Moreover, the damages limitation provision in the PSLRA's companion bill also declined to adopt a computation method.76 By declining to include such a method, Congress indicated a desire to
limit plaintiffs' leverage and implement underlying policy goals,
rather than to endorse a particular theory of market movement
or pose an alternative to the ECMH. By imposing a "look-back"

See id at 13 (noting that information asymmetry is at the heart of the crash theory).
' HR Conf Rep No 104-369 at 42, (cited in note 68). There is no reason to believe, that,
in computing damages, courts will move away from the out-of-pocket approach or the
event study and comparable index methods discussed in Part I.C. See note 59. The courts'
practice led to uncertainty because, prior to trial, defendants do not know what parameters a court will use in constructing the value line or which dates will be used in an event
study.
. The competing proposal read:

[T]he plaintiff's damages shall not exceed the lesser ofthe difference between the price paid by the plaintiff for the security and the market
value of the security immediately after dissemination to the market of information
which corrects the misstatement or omission; and
the difference between the price paid by the plaintiff for the security and the price at
which the plaintiff sold the security after dissemination of information correcting the
misstatement or omission.
S 240 § 104, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 8, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec S 1078 (Jan 18, 1995). In
fact, the legislative history indicates that Congress may have hoped to create a calculation
method. See S Rep No 104-98 at 28 (cited in note 20) ("Plaintiff's damages will be calculated" based on the bounce-back period); HR Conf Rep No 104-369 at 42 (cited in note 68)
(stating that the provision "requires that plaintiff's damages be calculated" using the lookback period). However, not only does the statutory language contradict this, but it would
also make little sense to allow plaintiffs to benefit from further declines in market price
after corrective disclosure. The more logical reading of this portion of the legislative history is that Congress assumed that, for simplicity's sake, the parties would choose to use
the limit as a basis for entering settlement negotiations. Also, unlike the courts' techniques, the provision fails to take into account any movement attributable to a rising (or
declining) market. See Part I.C.
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limitation, Congress simply ensured that if the stock price does
crash and rebound, plaintiffs are not overcompensated as they
would be if they received a damage award based on the stock's
low point and could then obtain above-market returns after the
crash.7
There is an exception to the limitation on damages that further reinforces the notion that avoidance of plaintiff overcompensation was the primary motivation behind the damages provision.
The exception, which applies whenever a plaintiff sells during the
ninety-day bounce-back period, provides that she may recover the
difference between the purchase price and the near trading price
for the period beginning from the time the fraud is disclosed and
ending on the date of sale. Thus, if a plaintiff sells immediately,
she is able to recover her entire loss on the security (purchase
price less amount recovered upon sale).7' Recovery is allowed
even if the share price crashes and rebounds following the corrective disclosure. Here, the break from Lev and de Villiers's theoretical approach is clear: they argue that because "crash damages" are not causally linked to the defendant's fraud, they
should not be awarded.7' Because the PSLRA allows plaintiffs to
recover "crash damages" by selling right after disclosure of the
fraud, it is clear that the intent of Congress is simply to prevent
plaintiffs from reaping the benefit of both the bounce-back (if
any) and a damage award calculated on the basis of the immediate postdisclosure price. The private action continues to serve as
insurance against fraud. Congress simply tried to ensure that
shareholders recover only for losses actually sustained." Hence,
The legislative history indicates that this was Congress's primary concern. See HR
Conf Rep No 104-369 at 42 (cited in note 68) ("Calculating damages based on the date corrective information is disclosed may end up substantially overestimating plaintiffs damages.!).
" The exact text of the exception provides that:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff seeks to establish damages by reference to the market price of a security, if the plaintiff sells or repurchases the subject security prior to the expiration of the 90-day period described
in paragraph (1), the plaintiff's damages shall not exceed the difference between the
purchase or sale price paid or received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the security and the mean trading price of the security during the period beginning immediately after dissemination of information correcting the misstatement or omission and
ending on the date on which the plaintiff sells or repurchases the security.
15 USC § 78u-4(eX2).
" See Lev and de Villiers, 47 Stan L Rev at 22-23 (cited in note 14) (arguing that, even
if not fully compensated, investors should be denied crash damages "because there is an
insufficient causal nexus between the crash and the fraud").
"There does not appear to be any provision in the statute to prevent a potential
plaintiff from selling and then repurchasing the security in question (with the obvious risk
that there will be no bounce-back in her particular case). Note also that the alternative
provision was designed to preserve the insurance function of Rule 10b-5 litigation while
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the PSLRA's limitation on damages suggests that Congress has
opted for a pragmatic approach to securities fraud that is designed to preserve the insurance function of the 10b-5 class action
while improving the administration of claims rather than one
that begins with any specific theory of market movement.8 '
Thus, the overall direction of the PSLRA is practical, not
theoretical. Congress wanted to limit frivolous suits in order to
improve the efficacy of private enforcement actions, thereby improving capital allocation-using efficiency in a normative, but
not descriptive, fashion.82 Part III discusses how this atheoretical
approach should affect judicial use of the ECMH.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CONGRESS'S ATHEORETICAL APPROACH
A. Courts Should Avoid Using the ECMH as a Descriptive Tool
The PSLRA's text and its legislative history indicate that
Congress is committed to the normative goal of making the securities markets more efficient. At the same time, Congress is skeptical about the ECMH-s validity, but no more or less so than of
any other attempt to describe the market's operation. The PSLRA
reflects an approach to securities litigation that begins with a
pragmatic goal-reducing the burdens that frivolous securities
litigation places upon the capital markets." As a consequence,
courts should be reluctant to use the ECMH as the foundation for
analyzing securities actions, because they lack the institutional
competence to make such judgments. As Justice White pointed
out in Basic, "Congress, with its superior resources and expertise,
preventing overcompensation (by granting the plaintiff the lesser of the amount actually
lost or the amount by which her losses could have been limited had she sold immediately
following the corrective disclosure rather than continuing to hold the stock). See note 76.
s See Scudder, Comment, 92 Nw U L Rev at 464 (cited in note 3) ("The Reform Acts
damage provisions... provide no coherent theory for limiting damages.").
' It could also be argued that Congress was motivated to pass the PSLRA by a desire
to help a particular interest group--corporate issuers. However, it would be odd to include
the sale price exception to the limitation on damages if the legislation were purely a product of competing political interests. Instead, Congress could prescribe a fixed cap, or even
a calculation method that substantially limited damages. While a "public choice' explanation seems plausible for the anti-plaintiffs' bar provisions discussed in notes 68-69 and accompanying text, it seems less plausible here. More importantly, such a motivation would
nevertheless imply a pragmatic (if not as well-intentioned) approach, rather than a theoretical one.
Alternatively, Congress could be viewed as merely having taken steps to protect
public companies. Such a reading, at least in the context of the damages provision, seems
less plausible than the claims administration-based interpretation of the limitation on
damages discussed in Part II.C. More importantly, however, a public choice reading would
nevertheless indicate a congressional predilection for a pragmatic, not theoretical, starting
point in analyzing securities litigation.
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is far better equipped than the federal courts for the task of determining how modern economic theory and global financial markets require that established legal notions of fraud be modified."'
However, Congress, skeptical of the ECMH and other theories,
declined to pass judgment and opted instead to emphasize policy
results rather than descriptive efficiency. Hence, courts have no
mandate to decipher the mysteries of stock price movements.'
Rather, the question of the securities markets' informational efficiency-fundamentally a question for financial economics-should be left to financial economists. Courts, by contrast, should
be restrained in using theory and take an approach that follows
the policy-based approach put forth in the PSLRA's limitation on
damages.
B. The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory as a Presumption of
Causation in an Active Market
Initially, it might appear that because Congress rejected descriptive efficiency through the enactment of the PSLRA, courts
should discontinue their use of the fraud-on-the-market theory. If
courts do not rely on the semi-strong ECMH, then the presumption of reliance, rooted in a belief about how markets incorporate
information, may also be inappropriate. Given congressional
skepticism toward the ECMH (or any other theoretical model
that attempts to describe the market), the fraud-on-the-market
theory may be at odds with the PSLRA. Perhaps courts should
reinstate the individual reliance requirement. At the same time,
however, courts should be reluctant to abandon a theory that facilitates private actions, 6 especially because Congress rejected a
version of the securities litigation reform proposals that would
have entirely eliminated fraud-on-the-market actions."7 Such actions are an "essential tool" in securities enforcement.1
Basic, 485 US at 254 (White concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Even if they did, Justice White pointed out that courts are probably not "in much of
a position to assess which theories aptly describe the functioning of the securities industry.- Id at 254-55.
' Of the few cases to reach the appellate level since the enactment of the PSLRA on
December 22, 1995, none indicates that a court has changed its use of fraud-on-the-market
in response to the statute. See, for example, Gilford Partners,LP v Sensormatic Electronics Corp, 1997 WL 757495, *7-8 (N D Ill) (analyzing a fraud-on-the-market claim without
note of the PSLRA); Havenick v Network Express, Inc, 981 F Supp 480, 522-24 (E D Mich
1997) (discussing the pleading requirements of the PSLRA, but never discussing the possibility that the fraud-on-the-market theory is no longer viable).
' See Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, HR 10 § 204, 104th Cong, 1st Sess
(Jan 4, 1995) (requiring actual reliance in 10b-5 actions).
8 See Basic, 485 US at 231.
8
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Courts should resolve the tension between the PSLRA and
descriptive efficiency not by abandoning the fraud-on-the-market
theory, but rather by recharacterizing it in a way that does not
require reliance on financial theory, but instead emphasizes
probability. Such a move would require three distinct changes.
First, the fraud-on-the-market theory should be understood as a
presumption of causation, entirely subsuming the traditional reliance requirement. Second, the level of market activity, not efficiency, should be the focus of judicial inquiry. Third, courts ought
to weigh the credibility and intensity of the misleading statement
or omission, as many now do when considering the truth-on-themarket defense.89 These changes all emphasize practical inquiries
that utilize courts' traditional areas of competence, rather than
casting them into the world of theoretical financial economics.
1.

The fraud-on-the-market theory should invoke a
presumption of causation, not reliance.

Rather than interpreting fraud-on-the-market as a rebuttable presumption of reliance, courts should instead understand the
theory as a method of proving causation. In invoking the presumption, a court would simply determine whether, as a matter
of "common sense and probability," the defendant's fraud likely
affected share price. The reliance requirement would thus be subsumed in the causation inquiry. A class of defrauded investors,
able to establish a common sense presumption of causation,
would not face any additional "reliance" requirement.
Understanding the fraud-on-the-market theory as creating a
presumption of reliance is problematic because it forces courts -to
use the ECMH to describe market operations. The ECMH is part
of the fraud-on-the-market theory because describing the presumption as "reliance on the integrity of the market price" entails
a judgment about the operation of the market as a whole and an
evaluation about its various participants' chances for success.
Neither of these tasks is something at which courts are particularly adept. By focusing on causation, judges need not consider
whether there was sufficient integrity in the market price to justify allowing the plaintiff class to move forward. Rather, courts
applying the fraud-on-the-market theory would determine
whether common sense dictates that the defendant's fraud caused
the market price to change, not the degree to which the market
accurately valued the new information. When it is clear that

See Part I.B.2.
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there is a "crooked crap game,"90 the presumption is invoked; otherwise it is not. This proposal better utilizes the courts' institutional competence and better tracks congressional sentiments (as
expressed in the PSLRA) by focusing attention on the particular
circumstances surrounding the fraud rather than on disputed finance theory.
At first glance, this may appear to be a substantial doctrinal
change. However, more careful analysis indicates that, while removing the reliance requirement will shift courts away from
theoretical inquiries and toward a pragmatic approach, it does
not represent a dramatic departure from existing practice. Several courts, both before and after Basic, have suggested such an
understanding of the fraud-on-the-market theory. One early case,
Blackie v Barrack,9 recognized "that materiality directly establishes causation more likely than not, and that reliance as a
separate requirement is merely a milepost on the road to causation."92 In Eckstein v Balcor Film Investors,93 Judge Easterbrook
noted that:
The Supreme Court's adoption of the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine in [Basic] shows that reliance is not essential; although Basic continued to use that word, it allowed an alternative method of establishing causation-an effect on market price-to support recovery by investors who never read
the supposedly deceitful statement.'
Other courts confronting the fraud-on-the-market theory should
follow this reformulation.
2.

Emphasize activity, not efficiency.

In deciding whether to extend the fraud-on-the-market presumption of causation to the plaintiff class, courts must look at
the level of activity, not efficiency, within the market. When considering causation, the focus of courts' inquiry should rest on the
probability that a statement affected market price.9 5 Thus, in order to take advantage of the fraud-on-the-market theory and esBasic, 485 US at 247, quoting Schlangerv Four-PhaseSystems Inc, 555 F Supp 535,
538 (S D NY 1982).
524 F2d 891 (9th Cir 1975).
Id at 906 n 22.
8 F3d 1121 (7th Cir 1993).
Id at 1129 (citations omitted). See also Grossman v Waste Management,Inc, 589 F
Supp 395, 400 (N D 1111984) (discussing the relationship between reliance and causation).
' The ECMH, of course, allowed courts to avoid this inquiry because it posits not only
that statements are incorporated into price, but that publicly available information will be
properly valued. Without this presumption, further inquiry is necessary.
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tablish that common issues of law and fact (particularly related
to the misrepresentation, scienter, and damages elements of a
10b-5 claim) predominate, plaintiffs must show that a security
was widely traded during the period in question. This factual inquiry allows courts to make a common sense judgment that, with
all the traders out there, a substantial number used the fraudulent information.
Courts have already developed the tools necessary to conduct
this fact-based inquiry. The commonly accepted requirements for
plaintiffs seeking to invoke the fraud-on-the-market doctrine
were first articulated in Cammer v Bloom.' There, the court considered five criteria: (1) average weekly trading volume; (2) the
number of securities analysts who regularly follow the stock; (3)
the number of market makers for the stock; (4) whether the company was qualified to file an S-3 registration statement; and (5)
past indications that disclosures of information caused the share
price to move." All of these criteria measure one basic attributethe degree of activity in the market for the stock." Thus, courts
should balance these factors in deciding whether the probability
that the information affected price is sufficiently high, such that
common sense would dictate that the plaintiffs were probably
wronged. Hence, courts are well equipped to conduct a causation
inquiry. These factors all relate to their basic factfinding function, rather than forcing them to adopt a particular financial theory.
3.

Incorporate the "credibility and intensity" requirement.

The effect of requiring an active market is to increase the
probability that the allegedly misleading statement or omission
affected the trading price of the security, thereby making the
causation presumption more sensible. If courts, however, no
longer assume the existence of the rapid and comprehensive information processing that is predicted by the ECMH, then they
711 F Supp 1264 (D NJ 1989).
Id at 1286-87. A number of courts have adopted the Camrnertest. See, for example,
Hayes v Gross, 982 F2d 104, 107 n 1 (3d Cir 1992); Freeman, 915 F2d at 198-99; Simpson v
Specialty Retail Concepts, 823 F Supp 353, 354 (M D NC 1993); In re Sahlen and Associates, Inc SecuritiesLitigation,773 F Supp 342, 356-57 (S D Fla 1991); In re MDC Holdings
SecuritiesLitigation, 754 F Supp 785, 804 (S D Cal 1990).
9 Eligibility for S-3 filing depends on market capitalization, not activity. Nevertheless,
it is fair to assume a substantial correlation between market capital, which S-3 eligibility
does indicate, and market activity, the focus of the test. At least one court has described
the theory as requiring an "active" market. See Abell, 858 F2d at 1121 (allowing reliance
on the theory when 'the plaintiff can establish that the subject securities were traded on
an active secondary market").
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must conclude that the likelihood that a defendant's statement
affected a share's price depends on its credibility and on the intensity with which it was disseminated.' Hence, courts should
consider these factors when deciding whether to permit the plaintiff class to enjoy a presumption of causation. If the allegedly
fraudulent statement is so far-fetched (such as an announcement
of dramatically higher earnings) as to raise doubts as to its validity, then the probability that it had a material effect on price is
low-even in an active market. Similarly, a widely publicized
statement (such as one made in a press conference or published
in a major newspaper) is more likely to have affected share price
than one that received little attention.
The consideration of credibility and intensity represents a
substantial change in the construction of the fraud-on-the-market
theory,"° but it builds on two existing judicial practices in Rule
10b-5 litigation. First, it is a straightforward extension of the intensity and credibility requirement imposed by the Ninth Circuit
in In re Apple Computer Securities Litigation.'' There, defendants asserting a truth-on-the-market defense were required to
show that the corrective information was released with sufficient
credibility and intensity. °2 Plaintiffs asserting a fraud-on-themarket claim should be required to make a similar demonstration
regarding the allegedly fraudulent statement or omission. Given
Congress's skepticism toward the ECMH, it is sensible to deny
both sides the opportunity to rely on it in establishing that the information in question affected share price. Hence, both plaintiffs
and defendants should be subject to an assessment of the credibility and intensity of the information that each uses to bolster its
side.
Second, the requirement that plaintiffs show that the allegedly fraudulent statement was credible builds on the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine developed by courts to shield defendants who
accompany their statements with appropriate caveats. Under this
rule, reliance on projections, despite an issuer's warnings against
doing so, is per se unreasonable.' Unlike the bespeaks caution
"Under the semi-strong ECMH, the market is assumed to discount properly all information for any possible lack of credibility (i.e., other investors could not, through investigation, determine that the market had overvalued or undervalued the statement). The
same is true for intensity-under the ECMH, all information is impounded into price, irrespective of whether it appears on the front page or in the fine print.
"A search of cases revealed no court that has applied these factors to a plaintiff's
fraud-on-the-market claim.
886 F2d 1109 (9th Cir 1989). See Parts I.B.2 and III.C.
"'Idat 1114
"See, for example, Parnes v Gateway 2000, Inc, 122 F3d 539, 548 (8th Cir 1997)
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doctrine, however, the credibility requirement proposed here
shifts attention away from the reasonableness of actual reliance
and focuses on the probability that the statement had an effect on
price. Furthermore, unlike the proposed solution, which focuses
on probability, the existing doctrine leaves only two options-either the required cautionary language or context is present (in
which case the defendant's statement is not actionable), or it is
1°4
not (in which case the doctrine is irrelevant).
It is thus possible for courts to take an atheoretical approach
to the fraud-on-the-market presumption by focusing on causation,
rather than reliance. They should weigh all of the factors affecting the probability that a fraudulent statement had an effect:
market activity, intensity, and credibility. Not only will courts
better utilize areas of traditional institutional competence (factfinding and assessing credibility), but they have also already developed many of the necessary tools.
4.

Advantages of this reformulation.

This proposed understanding of the fraud-on-the-market
theory offers several advantages over the current model. First, it
limits courts' rhetorical use of the ECMH. Second, it prevents
courts from being forced to make determinations outside of their
area of expertise. Third, it aligns the fraud-on-the-market theory
with Congress's pragmatic approach to private securities actions.
As discussed above, adherence to the ECMH is not critical for
the fraud-on-the-market theory. Rather, courts appear to apply it
for largely rhetorical reasons." 5 As one commentator has explained, because Basic invoked the concepts of finance theory, its

(noting that cautionary statements can render forward-looking statements immaterial); In
re DonaldJ. Trump Securities Litigation, 7 F3d 357, 371-72 (3d Cir 1993) (requiring "the
cautionary statements [to] be substantive and tailored to the specific future projections,
estimates or opinions in the prospectus which the plaintiffs challenge"); In re Worlds of
Wonder Securities Litigation, 814 F Supp 850, 858-59 (N D Cal 1993), affd in part and
revd in part, 35 F3d 1407 (9th Cir 1994) (applying the bespeaks caution doctrine to optimistic projections in issuer's prospectus). Other courts have looked more broadly, analyzing the context of the statement. See, for example, Epstein v Washington Energy Co, 83
F3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir 1996) (analyzing the regulatory context of defendant's predictions).
'No court appears to have "split the difference"; all treat bespeaks caution as a
threshold question. See, for example, Epstein, 83 F3d at 1141 ("[Rleliance on predictive
statements in the context of regulatory proceedings is inherently unreasonable [and thus
not actionable]."); In re Worlds of Wonder, 814 F Supp at 859 ("Estimates or forecasts of
future performance in a prospectus are not actionable if the prospectus contains conspicuous language that bespeaks caution as to actual results.").
"See Langevoort, 140 U Pa L Rev at 856 (cited in note 1) (noting that use of the
ECMH is "often more rhetorical than real").
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"reasoning took on the aura of intellectual inevitability. "c°" The
use of the ECMH as justificatory rhetoric raises two concerns.
First, even if the theory plays a minor role in the doctrines in
which it appears, the use of the ECMH endorses a particular view
of how markets operate. By starting with a presumption that the
ECMH is correct, courts will frame future doctrinal debates
within the confines of a particular economic theory. Other possible analyses that presume inefficient markets may be excluded
before they are considered." 7 Given their lack of democratic accountability, as well as their limited expertise in the area, courts
should abstain from this type of advocacy. Additionally, the continued use of a descriptive notion of efficiency in the fraud-on-themarket context may lead to a broader role for the ECMH-particularly in the takeover and corporate governance areas."e The
proposed reformulation offers the benefit of reducing the judiciary's rhetorical use of finance theory.
Another advantage of the suggested reconstruction of the
fraud-on-the-market theory is that it minimrzes the opportunity
for litigants to force courts to decide questions of finance theory
rather than fact. By including the ECMH in the fraud-on-themarket theory, courts have given defendants the opportunity to
claim that periods of excess volatility and seemingly inexplicable
price movements indicate that the market for a particular security is inefficient, thereby making the presumption of reliance on
the integrity of the market price improper.0 9 Analyzing this claim
requires courts to drift far from their institutional competence.
Moreover, it requires the courts to delve into a subject area-finance theory-the problems of which Congress, the more competent institution, has been unable to resolve.
'"Id at 902. See also Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86
Mich L Rev 752, 761 (1988) (arguing that economic vocabulary is sometimes used "to
evoke a sense of scientific power, to claim precision without necessarily using it").
"See Donald N. McCloskey, The Consequences ofRhetoric, in Arjo Elamer, Donald N.
McCloskey, and Robert M. Solow, eds, The Consequences of Economic Rhetoric, 280, 28690 (Cambridge 1988) (discussing the importance of rhetoric and word choice in guiding
economic debate).
'"See Langevoort, 140 U Pa L Rev at 914 (cited in note 1) (expressing concern that
regulators and judges may "thoughtlessly reify [market efficiency] rhetoric, in areas such
as the regulation of takeovers or the role of shareholder monitoring").
"While the emphasis on market activity in the Cammer factors, see notes 96-97 and
accompanying text, may preclude this type of claim from succeeding, many courts' articulation of the fraud-on-the-market theory requires that information be accurately, as well
as rapidly, incorporated into stock price. See, for example, In re Burlington Coat Factory,
114 F3d at 1419 n 8 (attributing this position to Basic). Indeed, one of the litigants in
Cammer tried to make this argument. See 711 F Supp at 1281 (noting defendant's argument that "there has never been a rigorous economic study of the efficiency of the overthe-counter market").
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In addition, the PSLRA's damage limitation provision reflects a desire to allow private actions to continue to act as "fraud
insurance."" By concentrating on the probability that the defendant's fraud was responsible for the plaintiffs' losses, the proposed reform allows courts to be effective claims administrators.
Otherwise, market inefficiencies could lead to judicial error--either by allowing plaintiffs to recover when common sense dictates
that the likelihood of an effect was small, or by denying recovery
when the corrective disclosure was unlikely to have been effective.
Perhaps most importantly, focusing the fraud-on-the-market
theory on probability aligns courts' actions with Congress's policy
goals, and adheres to Basic's description of the role of judicial
presumptions."' As the Senate Committee Report on the PSLRA
indicates, Congress believed that the federal courts had allowed
frivolous securities litigation to undermine, rather than further,
public welfare."' The plaintiff's additional requirements-showing credibility and intensity-will deter suits based on puffery
and trivial statements without adversely affecting those based on
legitimate grievances. Thus, the proposed reformulation serves
the express congressional goal of tightening the restrictions on
securities class action plaintiffs. At the same, it incorporates the
policy goals underlying Basic and congressional skepticism towards the ECMH.
Courts may be concerned that by eliminating the reliance requirement, they would undercut Congress's chosen path in the
PSLRA-reducing plaintiff leverage. At first glance, removing an
element should make a case easier to prove. Here, however, this
is not the case. First, the proposed reformulation will focus courts
on legitimate harms caused by fraud. By emphasizing the level of
market activity, as well as the credibility and intensity of the al"'See Part II.C.
.See Basic, 485 US at 245 (describing four purposes for presumptions: fairness, judicial economy, probability, and public policy). If implicated at all, considerations of fairness
and judicial economy seem to weigh in favor of the proposed changes. Plaintiffs and defendants will face similar hurdles and courts will be left with an atheoretical inquiry more
suited to their institutional competence. Admittedly, however, assessing the mix of market
activity, credibility, and intensity could involve complex considerations, thereby raising
decision costs. At least one lower court has noted this point. See Gilford Partners,1997
WL 757495 at *7 n 5 ('The Court noted that it was not necessarily accepting the validity
of any particular version of the [ECMH] .... Instead, it adopted the general assumption
based upon considerations of probability, judicial economy and the public policy underlying the Exchange Act.").
..
See S Rep No 104-98 at 4 (cited in note 20) (claiming that the judiciary has created
"substantial uncertainties and opportunities for abuses of investors, issuers, professional
firms and others").
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legedly fraudulent statement,"' courts can help to eliminate the
frivolous suits targeted by Congress in a way consistent with its
pragmatic approach. Because a court will refrain from making
anything other than a common sense judgment about the market,
plaintiffs will be able to move forward only in cases of clear fraud.
More fundamentally, however, the reliance "requirement" does
not place a meaningful burden on plaintiffs. The fraud-on-themarket theory treats reliance on the integrity of the market as a
goal of securities regulation," 4 not a requirement for members of
the plaintiff class. In other words, reliance in fraud-on-themarket cases concerns a right to rely on a belief that the market
is free of fraud, not an element in a significant sense." 5 Thus,
taking a policy-based, rather than theoretical, approach does not
risk reopening the floodgates that the PSLRA was in large part
designed to close.
C. Rebutting the Presumption: Truth-on-the-Market
Because the truth-on-the-market defense makes more extensive use of the ECMH than does the basic fraud-on-the-market
claim," ' it might appear to make it difficult for courts to remove
descriptive efficiency from Rule 10b-5 litigation. In fact, 'the proposed reformulation of the fraud-on-the-market theory greatly
simplifies its truth-on-the-market corollary. As discussed
above," 7' the activity requirement rests on the simple premise
that as the market becomes more active, the probability that the
fraud affected price increases. The same is true for corrective disclosures. Courts should focus on the point at which the presence
of truth-adjusted for intensity, credibility, and the level of market activity-makes the causal relationship between fraud and
price no longer a matter of "common sense,""8 but instead a descriptive judgment about market operations that requires specialized competence that courts generally lack. Hence, plaintiffs
Parts III.B.2 and III.B.3.
...
See Basic, 485 US at 246 (noting that the disclosure requirements are designed to
"facilitate an investors reliance on the integrity of those markets"); Blackie, 524 US at 907
("The statute and rule are designed to foster an expectation that securities markets are
free from fraud-an expectation on which purchasers should be able to rely.") (emphasis
added).
..See, for example, Fischel, 74 Cornell L Rev at 918-19 (cited in note 14) (discussing
the irrebuttability of the fraud-on-the-market presumption and showing that Basi's own
exceptions involve cases where no fraud has occurred).
..See Part I.B.2.
"See Part III.B.
"'Again, this is the essence of Blackmun's fraud-on-the-market opinion. See Basic, 485
US at 246.
"'See
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will be able to move forward using the fraud-on-the-market theory only when it is clear that the defendant's fraudulent assertion
is likely to have affected price and was not counteracted by corrective information already in the market at the time of the
fraud. Although this may appear to be an overly harsh rule that
will exclude meritorious cases, it seems unlikely that it will deter
many plaintiffs who are victims of intentional fraud, the conduct
against which Congress seems most eager to protect.119 It is
doubtful that issuers who are trying to mislead investors will do
so with statements that more than a small handful of insiders
know to be false.
In essence, the truth-on-the-market defense uses the same
argument that underlies the position that a fraud-on-the-market
claim should depend on activity, not efficiency; in an active market, information (either corrective or misleading) is likely to affect
price. Determining the relative level of those two effects (fraudulent information and corrective disclosure) is beyond the courts'
inherent competence and is a project even Congress is reluctant
to undertake. Under this proposed change to the fraud-on-themarket theory, courts would deny plaintiffs the advantage of the
presumption when the level of corrective information raises a
significant doubt about the effect of the fraud on share price,
thereby forcing the court to make a descriptive judgment about
market efficiency. Thus, the truth-on-the-market theory should
remain a defense, not for the ECMH-based reasons articulated by
the courts; but because it undercuts the probability of causation
on which the fraud-on-the-market theory should depend.
D. The Heuristic Efficiency Problem
Congress's apparent turn away from finance theory also creates a dilemma for courts attempting to determine damages in
securities fraud cases. Clearly, the use of efficiency as a normative concept makes sense and remains consistent with legislative
direction. On the other hand, efforts to describe the market using
the ECMH seem contrary to Congress's atheoretical approach
and, more specifically, to its concern that markets will systematically overreact to corrective disclosures. Damage calculation
methods, however, do not claim that the market is truly efficient;
they merely assume efficiency because courts lack the expertise
"'9See PSLRA § 101, 109 Stat at 747, codified at 15 USC § 78u-4(b)(2) (requiring plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts relating to the defendants state of mind); id at § 201,
109 Stat at 758, codified at 15 USC § 78u-4(gX2XA) (imposing joint and several liability
only on defendants who knowingly make fraudulent statements).
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necessary to determine the effect, if any, of market inefficiencies.
If Congress truly does not believe in the ECMH, then it might
seem that courts should not only refrain from doctrinal approaches that attempt to describe the market as efficient, but
should also avoid using efficiency as a heuristic device.
In the end, however, the changes in the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine proposed by this Comment-and their relationship to the
truth-on-the-market defense-do not imply that courts must find
new methods to calculate damages. Using the ECMH in damage
calculations is problematic only if the goal of the out-of-pocket
method is something other than simply predicting the security's
price absent fraud at the time it was purchased. The core insurance function of the out-of-pocket approach requires only a best
guess; it is entirely possible that the stock was overvalued or undervalued (for reasons other than the fraudulent statement)
when the defrauded plaintiff purchased it. As noted in Part I.C,
the ECMH is not crucial to the doctrinal basis for the out-ofpocket approach to damages; it is employed only for lack of a better method. The same institutional competence concerns that
should lead courts to abandon their use of efficiency as a descriptive concept should also lead them to continue to employ efficiency as a heuristic device in order to calculate damages. Unable
to make sophisticated judgments about the financial markets,
courts should be as wary of embarking on efforts to find better
methods of predicting stock prices as they are of attempting to
draw a general conclusion about the market's condition.
The case for continued use of efficiency as a heuristic device
is even stronger in the context of reviewing settlements. 0 If the
two sides reach an agreement that is fair and reasonable, but
that nevertheless appears to use an efficiency-dependent method
for calculating damages, nothing in the PSLRA indicates that
courts should question this judgment. 2 ' Thus, courts should re
quire only that the market's estimate be reasonable, not precisely
accurate. Share prices might be biased in a particular direction;
this bias could be uncovered with further analysis of publicly

" This is, in practical terms, a far more significant context than that of fixing damages
because an overwhelming majority of securities fraud cases settle if plaintiffs are able to
pass the summary judgment stage. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News
in Securities ClassActions, 41 UCLA L Rev 1421, 1422 (1994) (noting that most securities
fraud actions settle rather than go to trial).
12
When deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, courts must examine
whether the proposal is "fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable." In re Clearly Canadian SecuritiesLitigation, 966 F Supp 930, 932 (N D Cal 1997), quoting Torrisi v Tucson ElectricPowerCo, 8 F3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir 1993).
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available information. However, in the settlement context, the
parties have consented to the market's valuation, whatever errors
and biases (if any) it may reflect. Consequently, unless there is
reason to suspect a substantial flaw in the price-setting process,
courts should defer to parties' choice of the market as a tool for
determining value. Excess volatility (an unusually high variance
in returns), a dramatic movement in the overall market price
level (especially a crash), or a major political crisis triggering
economic uncertainty could give a court reason to inquire further.
However, absent such circumstances, courts are unlikely to do
better than the parties.
CONCLUSION
Market efficiency appears as a normative, descriptive, and
heuristic concept in securities litigation. This Comment has argued that there is a conflict between courts' use of efficiency to
describe the markets (through their adherence to the ECMH) and
the damages limitation provisions in the PSLRA, which reflect a
congressional desire to limit plaintiffs' leverage and ensure that
defrauded plaintiffs are not overcompensated by market overreactions. Given Congress's commitment to these objectives, courts
should take notice.
The best approach for responding to the PSLRA is to remove
the ECMH from the fraud-on-the-market theory. The theory
should be treated as a common sense presumption that arises
with a showing of a sufficiently active market along with credible
and widely dispersed information. Simply put, fraud is likely to
cause a change in the price at which investors buy or sell securities in an active market. As a consequence, there is no reason for
courts to rely on theories that describe the market as efficient.
Instead, using "common sense and probability,"" courts should
attempt to ensure that no investor must "roll the dice in a
crooked crap game. " "

1

'Basic, 485 US at 246.
" Id at 247, quoting Schlanger,555 F Supp at 538.

